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Over the past several decades, significant resources have been expended by
Federal departments and agencies to implement more uniform and rigorous security
risk management processes and methods. However, despite the considerable sums
spent to affect change, security risk management efforts across the Federal
government have remained at roughly the same level in terms of sophistication,
coordination and comparability as they were more than a decade ago. Furthermore,
while some of these efforts have sought to dictate “standards” for government-wide
use, none have gained significant acceptance outside of the organizations where
they originated.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent creation of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), have added a further degree of complexity
to this issue. In addition to large numbers of new security risk analysis users, the
focus on homeland security that emerged in the wake of these attacks also imbued
security risk management efforts with significant sums of new money. DHS and
other Federal agencies have used the new funding to develop and implement a
variety of security programs, many of which rely on risk management principles as a
key part of their decision framework. Despite this, the numerous directives and
plans arising out of the homeland security enterprise either disseminate conflicting
guidance or remain silent on risk management methods that should be employed to
achieve comparable results. As a result, more than six years after 9/11, the Nation
has not yet achieved a consistent, risk-based approach that provides decision-
makers at all levels measurable results for intelligently reducing terrorist risks.
In the post 9/11 security environment, where the price of failure in both lives and
dollars can be staggering, few can argue about the role of risk management or the
urgency of overcoming the challenges to using it effectively. Just as the 9/11
Commission identified emergency responder radio interoperability as a critical
shortfall, clear guidance on “interoperable” risk analysis approaches is also needed
to permit effective risk communication between homeland security organizations with
similar missions. This article attempts to identify the primary reasons for this
apparent lack of progress, and explores a vision for implementing a more successful
risk management program that can provide the Nation the security it needs at a price
it can afford.
2Identifying the Problems
While there is virtually no disagreement over the need to use risk as a decision
support tool for homeland security activities, prior attempts to do so have failed
largely because they did not address the fundamental building blocks needed to
establish the basis for success. Figure 1 below illustrates this in more detail.
Figure 1.Creating the Foundation of Security Risk Management - The Building Blocks of Success
The underlying reasons for this trend are complex and bear further discussion:
□ Security risk management is an immature discipline that has developed
independently and unevenly across the Federal Government and private
industry. DHS leadership correctly seized on the applicability of security risk
analysis to the mandate of protecting the homeland, but it failed to ensure the
processes and cadre of experienced risk analysts necessary to effectively
serve the mission were in place. As such, there is still no system of
standardized professional development to attract and educate the number of
risk management practitioners the homeland security mission requires.
□ There is no national system of governance available to risk practitioners
for collaborating on building interoperability into their risk management
approaches. Lacking an interagency advisory board or recognized standard-
setting body, there is no way to synchronize divergent methods, arbitrate
disputes or resolve crosscutting issues. Consequently, security risk
practitioners often develop new methodologies rather than adopt, or adapt, an
existing approach that doesn’t fit their needs exactly. Furthermore, because



























































3the resulting data is often useless to other agencies that must then collect
similar data using another methodology.
□ There is no comprehensive, documented body of knowledge on the
current state of the security risk management discipline. There is no
encyclopedic reference to which practitioners may refer when considering
how to best meet their security risk analysis needs. Without this body of
knowledge, there is no way to determine where adequate methods already
exist, decide where to focus additional research and development or ensure
existing efforts are not duplicative and wasteful. Moreover, without this
collection of knowledge, it will be difficult to train the next generation of
security risk analysts and managers in a consistent manner.
□ The lack of a common professional language for security analysis and
risk management divides practitioners and makes collaboration difficult.
This "language deficit" serves as a fundamental impediment to a cooperative
approach on security risk analysis by the Government and the private sector.
While many attempts to dictate standards within individual Federal
departments and agencies have been attempted, their conflict with similar
efforts elsewhere only exacerbates the problem. Without a common language
to be used by practitioners when describing methods and needed
improvements, future progress will remain frustratingly slow.
□ Looking to the future, there is currently no capability to train or certify
the knowledge of security risk management professionals. Given the
huge investments being made in homeland security, coupled with the central
role of risk management, it would seem logical that training and certification of
current and future practitioners is a national requirement. Unfortunately, there
is currently no recognized approach to risk management training for
practitioners in Federal, state, and local government agencies, or in the
private sector. Absent this, it is difficult to imagine that risk management will
ever be done with accuracy, reliability or consistency.
Discussion
"The need for and difficulties associated with creating a coordinated, coherent risk
management approach to the nation’s homeland security have been widely
acknowledged since the events of September 11, 2001, and the creation of DHS.
Yet, this general acknowledgment has not been accompanied by the guidance
necessary to make consistent use of risk management across DHS."
U.S. Government Accountability Office
Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal Investments, GAO-O7-386T
Without the leadership and guidance necessary to overcome the noted challenges to
applying security risk management processes and methods in a consistent manner,
an intensely competitive environment between Federal departments and agencies,
the contractors who support them, the National Labs, and academia has developed.
The resulting free-for-all has slowed progress on this issue to a virtual standstill.
4As long as each Federal department and agency stands alone, synchronization of
methods and the ability to validate the conclusions of the resulting assessments is
not possible. The net effect is that, since 2001, over $12 billion1 has been distributed
to state and local governments by DHS based on assessments of risk that do not
provide any means to quantify the overall impact of the funds and that do not meet
any recognized standard. Moreover, the almost annual changes to the process for
allocating funding has prevented any sort of baseline from emerging and makes it
virtually impossible to know if, in fact, the Nation is any safer now than before 2001.
Recognizing the need for a constructive forum to collaborate, improve professional
methods and share information in a non-threatening environment, security
practitioners have begun to take matters into their own hands. For example, the
Security Analysis and Risk Management Association (SARMA) was formed in 2005
to help promote a balanced, cooperative approach to advancing security analysis
methods and the profession in general. Likewise, the American Society for Industrial
Security (ASIS) has begun developing its own risk management standard to fill the
void in Federal security efforts. Even international organizations, such as the Risk
Management Institute of Australasia, have stepped in to fill the void with an effort to
document a common body of knowledge for security risk management. As such
grass-roots movements gain momentum, the Federal government risks slipping still
further behind in shaping the future of security risk management.
This problem is not insurmountable, however. In fact, a similar problem has been
successfully addressed before. In 1988, then President Ronald Reagan issued
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 298, which created a National
Operations Security (OPSEC) Program in order to coordinate the efforts of all
Federal departments and agencies with national security missions. Among other
things, NSDD 298 created the Interagency OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS) to help
promote sound methods and educate current and future generations in the use of
the OPSEC methodology. Concerned practitioners also joined their efforts with
those of the IOSS by creating the OPSEC Professionals Society to further the
application of OPSEC as a professional discipline and foster high standards of
professionalism and competence among practitioners.
A Path Forward
The urgent need for improved security risk management processes and consistent
implementation across the Federal government requires strong leadership, a bold
vision for coordinated governance, and a comprehensive plan to implement the
partnerships necessary for a national strategy on security risk management. The
past two decades have shown that the “every agency for itself” approach will not
result in a coordinated national approach, as doing so is beyond the mission and
authority of any one Federal department or agency. The Government Accountability
Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) have both come to
recognize this may be the case. In a December, 2005, report on homeland security
risk management, GAO concluded:
1 Congressional Research Service, The Department of Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues,
and Options for Congress, Order Code RL33858, Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33858.pdf,
accessed Sept.25, 2007
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related agencies should be using similar methods. If agencies’ methods are
not compatible, then comparisons between agencies become difficult and
sector or national risk assessments becomes less reliable."2
CRS went further in detailing the importance not only of an interagency approach,
but a National one that necessitates partnerships with those outside of the Federal
government:
"A cohesive risk strategy and agreement on core terms amongst disparate
agencies is desirable because many aspects of the risk management process
are dependent on functions performed by agencies outside of the department.
However, the necessity of common definitions and standards goes beyond
the federal government. As states and localities continue to provide
information to be included in the risk assessment process, to include,
information on critical infrastructure sites within their respective jurisdictions
and, eventually, investigative information, the rational for attempting to
develop national-wide risk assessment strategy at all levels of government
becomes stronger."3
We end this subsection by proposing a framework for decision makers to consider
regarding the governance required to improve risk management nationally. The
authors believe the essential elements of such a framework would include:
Leadership
Resolution of the interagency leadership problem requires a clear mandate from the
White House to overcome the existing challenges. Steps that should be taken
include:
□ Issuing a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) or Homeland
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) creating a “National Security Risk
Management Program”. The HSPD/NSPD should establish a national
program for security risk management, complete with funding for a system of
governance of Federal efforts to produce a government-wide approach.
Through such a program, the White House could accelerate progress, reduce
massive duplication of efforts, and eliminate organizational conflicts and other
barriers.
□ Creating a security risk analysis governance infrastructure to help bring
rigor and standardization to the assessment of security risks, while
increasing confidence in the outcome. To this end, the creation of the
following two organizations is recommended:
2 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize
Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure, GAO-06-91, Dec. 2005, available at
[http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0691.pdf] accessed Sep. 25, 2007
3 Congressional Research Service, The Department of Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues,
and Options for Congress, Order Code RL33858, Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33858.pdf,
accessed Sept.25, 2007
6o A Security Advisory and Risk Standards Board (SARSB). A
SARSB would be officially recognized as the authoritative body for
Federal security risk management strategy, policy and standards.
Similar in concept to the approach used by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) in establishing Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) for the accounting industry, it would
provide oversight, guidance and standards development for all Federal
agencies. The leadership of the SARSB should include representatives
from all agencies with significant homeland security and national
security responsibilities.
The role of the SARSAB would be to:
̛ Develop a national architecture for Federal security risk
management and work in partnership with state and local
government, the private sector, professional associations and
academia to translate the architecture into a roadmap for
implementation.
̛ Be the Government’s authority on security risk management, with
responsibility for developing voluntary consensus standards and
recognizing best practices.
̛ Advise all Federal departments and agencies on the development
of new risk assessment methodologies, programs and policies, and
promote the convergence of existing approaches toward more
unified and compatible methods.
̛ Specify national level requirements for intelligence and counter-
intelligence information needed to support the threat analyses to be
used in risk assessments.
̛ Provide an annual report card on the progress of individual Federal
agencies in implementing risk management programs to support
security decision-making and investment prioritization.
̛ On an as-needed basis, chair dispute resolution meetings with
Federal departments or agencies with disagreements over security
risk management activities and policies that may affect
national/homeland security interests.
o An Interagency Risk Management Support Staff (IRMSS). The
function of an IRMSS would be to provide program development
support, technical expertise and training to Federal, state and local
governments, as well as the private sector. Addressing the shortage of
qualified risk methodologists and trainers in the Federal Government,
the IRMSS mission would centralize that expertise, making it available
in one place to support practitioners in achieving the national goal of a
mature, unified and broadly-accepted approach. It is also possible that
such a mission could be delegated to an existing organization, such as
the Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, which has deep experience in
supporting the national OPSEC Program at an interagency level.
7The role of the IRMSS would be to:
̛ Support the National Risk Management Program by providing
tailored training and assisting in program development.
̛ Produce educational multimedia products and presenting at
conferences for the homeland security, defense, intelligence and
public safety communities.
̛ Help Federal, state and local government organizations develop
self-sufficient interoperable risk management programs in order to
protect the American public, infrastructure and activities.
Guidance
Through the aforementioned approach, the White House could direct:
□ Federal departments and agencies to create a Chief Risk Officer (CRO)
position to synchronize, coordinate and monitor all security risk efforts
within their organizations. The CRO concept has been in widespread use
by the private sector for decades. Implementing such a position within key
Federal departments and agencies would elevate the importance of risk
management and end debates over who creates the necessary policies and
procedures and leads the risk management initiatives at the department
and/or agency-level.
□ Mandate that Federal departments and agencies participate in resolving
their differences through the SARSB. Participation in a respected, non-
governmental body, such as the SARSB, would help to elevate the discussion
beyond the unique and sometimes parochial interests of Federal departments
and agencies that have often doomed previous attempts to improve the
uniformity of risk management methods.
Public-Private Partnerships
Any comprehensive solution must also include active partnerships with the security
industry as an integral partner in achieving national plans, such as the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). Therefore, the White House should consider
recognizing appropriate security analysis/risk management professional
associations as partners in representing the private sector, academia and the
security risk analysis profession at large. Federal departments and agencies should
seek to benefit from the deeper and broader experience available through such
associations. The creation of this public-private partnership is necessary to establish
communication and buy-in between Federal and private sector practitioners
engaged in supporting national and homeland security missions. Such participation
will allow for the broadest input and greatly facilitate the adoption of standards by
the private sector. In turn, this will lead to a more uniform implementation of security
risk management in the United States.
SARMA is one such association working to address many of the necessary
foundational elements through its Common Knowledge Base (CKB) Program. The
initial focus of CKB Program is threefold: 1) documenting the analytical methods
8already in use; 2) establishing a common lexicon for security risk analysis; and, 3)
developing standardized approaches to key security risk analysis issues. To that
end, three specific projects have thus far been initiated:
□ The Common Lexicon Project is focusing on developing a broad-based,
consensus solution to the "language barrier" through the orderly collection of
existing terms, linguistic deconstruction of definitions, and the application of a
consensus process to arrive at acceptable common definitions.
□ The Encyclopedia of Security Analysis and Risk Assessment Methods is
using a Wiki-based approach to allow security practitioners across the nation
to provide documented descriptions of their methodologies in a current “state
of the profession” virtual encyclopedia.
□ The Generally Accepted Risk Assessment Principles Project, or GARAP,
is identifying and promulgating common practices and generally accepted
principles to bring added rigor and standardization to the process of assessing
security risks.
Each of these projects is being implemented in an open and transparent manner to
encourage participation by the broadest possible range of security risk analysis
practitioners. To learn more, visit the SARMA CKB Program web site at:
http://sarma-wiki.org.
Conclusions
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, highlighted the difficulty of protecting an
almost infinite number of targets with finite resources. The use of security risk
management is the approach chosen by our Nation’s leadership to address this
problem. Yet, in order to ensure the effectiveness of this effort and accurately
quantify its impact, the development and implementation of a national strategy for
security risk management is needed. The refinement and application of a more
uniform and coordinated approach to analyzing security risks will greatly enhance
our Nation’s ability to understand and manage a multitude of risks. It will also lead to
improved decision-making by Congress and the White House, as well as more
efficient prioritization of resources.
The creation of such a national system of governance and standards for security risk
management is beyond the mission and authorities of any one Federal department
or agency. Even with visionary leadership and direction it will not be easy, as the
U.S. Government Accountability Office and others have noted. Yet such a system is
necessary if we are to protect the people, infrastructure and economic prosperity of
the United States. The authors encourage the White House, Congress, Federal
departments and agencies, State and local governments and the security profession
to join forces and strive to achieve a National security risk management program that
will help provide the Nation the security it needs at a price it can afford.
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